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Abstract 
How does guanxi facilitate corrupt transactions? Utilizing fieldwork data and 
published materials, this paper investigates how guanxi practices distort the 
formal military promotion system and facilitate the buying and selling of military 
positions in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). It identifies three key functions 
of guanxi in facilitating corrupt transactions: communication, exchange and 
neutralization. Guanxi enables effective and safe communication among corrupt 
military officers, holds transaction partners to their word, and neutralizes their 
guilt about committing corrupt acts. 
Keywords: China, military corruption, guanxi, promotion, the PLA 
Since President Xi Jinping widened his anti-corruption drive within the PLA in 2014, 
dozens of generals have been placed under investigation or convicted of corruption, 
including two vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Xu Caihou 
and Guo Boxiong.
1
 The vast majority of generals caught in the anti-corruption 
campaign are from the General Political Department (GPD), the General Logistics 
Department (GLD) and military regions’ logistics departments, which control the 
selection of army officers and the enormous budgets that fund infrastructure and 
supplies.
2
 The downfall of these generals, especially Xu, who was in charge of 
personnel matters for 13 years, revealed the problem of buying and selling military 
positions.
3
 A retired PLA major-general, Yang Chunchang, points out that the 
strength of a candidate’s guanxi and his or her willingness to make bribe payments 
were essential criteria for recruitment to and allocation of military positions during 
Xu’s tenure.4 This prompted the author to explore the following questions: (1) what 
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role does guanxi play in the buying and selling of military positions? (2) What is the 
relationship between bribe payments and guanxi in this process? 
A PLA officer
5
 who sells military positions is able to help the buyer transfer to a 
better position at the same grade level (lateral transfer) or gain promotion to the next 
level up.
 6
 Each PLA officer is assigned one of 15 grade levels (zhiwu dengji, 职务等
级 ) which determine the officer’s status and authority in the PLA hierarchy. 7 
Although officers at the same grade level are equal in status, they occupy different 
positions (zhiwei, 职位) with different duties and powers. For example, a logistics 
officer in charge of fuel and supplies has more opportunity to obtain corrupt benefits 
than a specialized technical officer at the same grade level. In a given unit, the head of 
the cadre department has a higher chance of gaining promotion than the head of the 
publicity department even though they are always the same grade.
8
 These differences 
create incentives for PLA officers to use corrupt practices to transfer to a better 
position at the same grade level.  
The PLA has also established its rank (junxian, 军衔) system. In contrast with the U.S. 
military that has “10 officer grades and 10 equivalent ranks”, the PLA “has 15 grades 
and 10 ranks”.9 The terms “grade” and “rank” are not synonymous in the PLA, and 
each rank is associated with one to four grade levels.
10
 That is to say, officers’ ranks 
do not dictate their exact grades, authorities or responsibilities. As Allen explains, 
“rank is a key indicator of position within the hierarchy of foreign militaries”, while 
“grade [that is based on an officer’s position] is the key indicator of authority within 
the PLA”.11 As a result, PLA officers care more about position and grade rather than 
rank.
12
  
The existing literature on Chinese military corruption pays special attention to how 
the military’s resurgent commercialization in the 1980s and 1990s led to an explosion 
of corruption
13
 and smuggling
14
, but the buying and selling of military positions 
remains largely unexplored in the literature. Guanxi researchers have noted the 
corrosive effects of guanxi within China’s weak institutional environment and the 
relationship between guanxi practices and corruption,
15
 but these researchers excluded 
the study of guanxi’s role in military corruption because this topic lacks empirical 
                                                          
5
 Based on the nature of positions, PLA officers are classified as commanders, political officers, 
logisticians, armaments officers, specialized technical officers and academic staff. 
6
 Skype interview with former military officer S, December 2015.  
7
 Kaufman and Mackenzie 2009.    
8
 Skype interview with former military officer T, December 2015. 
9
 Allen and Shraberg 2011, 7. 
10
 For example, a “regiment leader-grade officer” should hold the rank of colonel or lieutenant colonel, 
while a lieutenant colonel may hold “the grade level of regiment leader, or regiment deputy leader, or 
battalion leader”. Please see: Kaufman and Mackenzie 2009, 75.  
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 Allen 2010, 6. 
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 Skype interview with former military officer T.  
13
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 Shieh 2005. 
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evidence. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the study of ‘the corruption-
facilitating roles of guanxi’16  by investigating military corruption in the People’s 
Republic of China. Specifically, it examines the negative effect of guanxi practices on 
the formal promotion system in the military and identifies how guanxi facilitates the 
buying and selling of military positions.   
Concept and theory 
Guanxi and guanxi practice 
Guanxi (关系) is frequently translated as a Chinese version of “social connections”, 
“particularistic ties” or “personal networks”, but these translations are not perfect 
because of “the complicated and rich meaning of the word”17. The meaning of guanxi 
varies according to context and, as Li argues, requires “the unspoken understanding of 
the contextual situation in which the conduct described in the conversation takes 
place”.18 For example, when one says, “lao Zhang shi wode guanxi” (senior Zhang is 
my guanxi, 老张是我的关系), the speaker uses guanxi to refer to a person; when one 
says, “laoban you henduo guanxi” (my boss has a lot of guanxi, 老板有很多关系), 
guanxi refers to social resources. Guanxi also refers to an act when it is used in verb-
phrases, such as “zou guanxi (to go through guanxi, 走关系), la guanxi (to pull 
guanxi, 拉关系), gao guanxi (to play guanxi, 搞关系)”.19 Guanxi scholars usually use 
the term “guanxi practice” to refer to these verb-phrases. Guanxi practice is defined 
by Li as  
an amalgamated concept representing the conduct and the process of conduct of 
soliciting, receiving, offering or delivering a service by one party to another, 
which satisfies the following conditions: (1) the service involves the exercise of 
entrusted power by one party, resulting in favorable treatment to the other, which 
also means that at least one of the parties is endowed with entrusted power, most 
notably, from a public entity; (2) the service is delivered either as a reciprocation 
to a favor previously received from the other party or as an act to generate proper 
reciprocation from the other party in the specified or unspecified future.
20
 
Guanxi and guanxi practice, as Keister points out, are “key to understanding all 
manner of social relations in China”.21  The formation and maintenance of guanxi, as 
Qi argues, need to “follow implicit social norms which seem to be purely local in their 
sense if not meaning”. 22 Key norms of guanxi include the principles of reciprocity, 
                                                          
16
 The theory of ‘the corruption-facilitating roles of guanxi’ is generated by Zhan in his journal article 
‘Filling the gap of formal institutions’. For more discussion, please see: Zhan 2012. 
17
 King 1991, 68. 
18
 Li, Ling 2011b, 166.  
19
 Ibid.  
20
 Li, Ling 2011a, 4. 
21
 Keister 2012; Chen, Chen and Huang 2013. 
22
 Qi 2012, 309-10. 
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mianzi (face, 面子), renqing (obligation, 人情) and ganqing (affection or sentiment, 
感情).23 Chinese culture emphasizes the importance of maintaining social harmony, 
requiring Chinese people to fulfill the “reciprocal obligations expected of all the 
parties in a social relationship”. 24  Failing to meet reciprocal expectations and 
obligations leads to the loss of mianzi—a person’s “social position or prestige” that 
enables him or her to gain access to resources or get things done.
25
 Renqing refers to 
the obligation to exchange symbolic and material resources within guanxi networks in 
order to build one’s mianzi and cultivate ganqing with other guanxi members.26 
Ganqing, as an affective component of guanxi and “an indicator of closeness of 
guanxi”27, “functions more as a safeguard measure for the favour-grantor to guarantee 
the return of the favour”28.  
The importance of guanxi in corrupt transactions 
China scholars view guanxi as an informal institution, substituting for or 
complementing the formal legal system in transitional China.
 29
 To be specific, private 
individuals and entrepreneurs tend to employ guanxi practices to protect property 
rights, safeguard transactions, obtain state-owned resources and resolve disputes in 
weak institutional environments characterized by a lack of market mechanisms and 
legal infrastructure.
30
 Moreover, guanxi networks, as Chang argues, are “used to 
bypass officially sanctioned, and onerous, bureaucratic procedures, solicit protection 
from more powerful actors, and acquire otherwise unavailable resources”.31  
Guanxi networks not only function as substitutive informal institutions for “achieving 
what formal institutions are designed, but fail, to achieve”32, but also offer efficient 
governing mechanisms to solve problems encountered during corrupt transactions. 
Compared with legal market transactions that are facilitated by market mechanisms 
and protected by the formal legal system, the actors in corrupt exchanges have to cope 
with a high level of environmental and behavioral uncertainty.
33
 The major threat for 
corrupt transactions is the risk of punishment, compelling transaction partners to 
create an operating environment that is characterized by a high degree of secrecy and 
opacity.
34
 Such an operating environment, however, leads to limited participation and 
limited exchange of information, preventing transaction participants from efficiently 
gathering information, evaluating the quality of corrupt services, and assessing 
                                                          
23
 Fan 2002a; Zhan 2012.  
24
 Wu and Leung 2005, 448.  
25
 Merrilees and Miller 1999, 268. 
26
 Luo 2000. 
27
 Wang, Cheng Lu 2007, 82. 
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 Li, Ling 2011b, 170. 
29
 Wang, Peng 2014.  
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 Chan 2009; Luo 2000; Peng 2003; Xin and Pearce 1996. 
31
 Chang 2001. 
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 Wang, Peng 2014, 812. 
33
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34
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potential partners’ willingness to comply with corrupt contracts.35 A participant in a 
corrupt transaction suffers from a high risk of being cheated by the counterpart (i.e. 
the transaction is subject to high level of behavioral uncertainty). On the one hand, 
corrupt exchanges are usually non-simultaneous, creating incentive for opportunistic 
behavior; on the other hand, corrupt contracts cannot be enforced by formal 
institutions.
36
 In addition, corrupt transactions needs to tackle the moral cost of 
demanding bribes and performing bribery.
37
   
Partners in corrupt transactions tend to employ guanxi practices to overcome these 
environmental and behavioral uncertainties. Recent years have witnessed a growing 
body of literature focusing on the ways in which guanxi facilitates corrupt 
transactions by coping with these uncertainties.
 38
 The theory of “the corruption-
facilitating roles of guanxi” generated by Zhan suggests three functions of guanxi in 
enhancing opportunities and incentives for public officials to engage in corruption: 
communication, exchange and norms.
39
 First, the guanxi network functions as a 
transmitter of information, helping members to identify potential exchange partners. 
Second, trust and reputation within the guanxi network facilitates the exchange of 
corrupt benefits between public officials and businesspeople by guaranteeing the 
fulfilling of all the agreed obligations from both sides and minimizing the risk of 
being detected and punished. Third, the norm of gift-giving and the principle of 
reciprocity encourage government officials to meet the demand from guanxi networks 
regardless of laws and regulations; that is to say, normative elements of guanxi 
networks distort the legal norms designed by state authority.  
Li’s research concentrates on the significance of guanxi practices in acts of bribery in 
China by investigating how guanxi practices remove both legal and moral barriers, 
control exchange risks and reduce moral costs.
 40
 As Li argues, exchanging favors 
with people who “are socially and/or sentimentally connected” is an effective strategy 
for reducing internal risks (e.g. non-performance of exchange partners) and external 
risks (e.g. the risk of exposure and the threat of legal punishment).
41
 This is because 
performing an opportunistic behavior with one exchange partner is equal to betray all 
members of the network, and collective responses from guanxi members to 
opportunistic behavior include the deprivation of membership benefits and even the 
exclusion of the opportunist from the guanxi network.
42
 The existing research into the 
function of guanxi networks in corrupt transactions offers a useful tool to help the 
author investigate the precise roles guanxi plays in the buying and selling of military 
positions. 
                                                          
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Della Porta and Vannucci 2005. 
37
 Balafoutas 2011. 
38
 Bian 1997; Lovett et al. 1999; Luo 2008; Wang, Peng 2013; Wang, Chunyu, Ye and Franco 2014; 
Xin and Pearce, 1996. 
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 Zhan 2012. 
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Data and Methods 
Collecting reliable data was the most difficult part of this research. The project was 
initially designed to rely on analysis of existing Chinese military publications. Special 
attention was paid to PLA official newspapers, including Liberation Army Daily 
(jiefangjun bao, 解放军报), Air Force News (kongjun bao, 空军报), Rocket Force 
News (huojianbing bao, 火箭兵报), and People’s Navy (renmin haijun, 人民海军). 
The author also made use of CNKI resources (China National Knowledge 
Infrastructure, 中国知网)43 and online searches using such keywords as “military 
corruption” (jundui fubai, 军队腐败), “buying and selling military positions” (jundui 
maiguan maiguan, 军队买官卖官), “anti-corruption in the PLA” (jiefangjun fanfu, 解
放军反腐) and “corruption related to appointment and promotion” (xuanren yongren 
fubai, 选人用人腐败 ). The published data, however, provided very limited 
information for the study of military corruption, especially the buying of promotion 
and the selling of position in the PLA. This encouraged the author to collect empirical 
data in China. 
Doing fieldwork in China about military corruption is extremely difficult because it is 
one of the most politically sensitive topics. International scholars, including those 
from Hong Kong, are perceived as ‘enemies’ by PLA officers and researchers. The 
investigator found it very hard to gain access to interviewees; they either declined 
invitations for interview altogether or merely offered information or viewpoints that 
were identical to news reports on state-owned media. The use of personal connections 
to collect data is perceived by scholars as the most effective strategy to obtain reliable 
information in mainland China.
44
 Unfortunately, this strategy is not always useful. 
The investigator employed his personal connections with PLA officers and relied on 
middlemen when such connections did not exist, but most of the PLA officers 
contacted still refused to be interviewed. The major concern for these officers was that 
their participation might impair their chances for promotion.  
The problem was not resolved until a middleman suggested the investigator should 
interview soon-to-be-demobilized PLA officers and retired officers. The investigator 
managed to conduct 20 interviews with PLA officers, former army officials and a 
military researcher. The quality of interview data from former military officers and 
army officials who are close to retirement is high, because sharing their perceptions of 
military corruption does not result in any significant career risk. Information from 
active-duty PLA officers and the military researcher, although limited, is helpful to 
test the validity and reliability of the interview data from the retired and soon-to-be-
demobilized officers. These interviews on the buying and selling of military positions 
generated around 87,000 words of transcript material. 
                                                          
43
 CNKI is the largest and the most comprehensive distributor of academic digital resources in China 
developed by Tsinghua University. It offers full-text access to academic journals, newspapers, doctoral 
dissertations and conference papers. 
44
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The investigator only managed to conduct interviews with low- and mid-level PLA 
officers and failed to gain access to high-ranking army officials. In this case, 
fieldwork data is helpful to explain how low- and mid-level officers make use of 
guanxi practices when buying and selling military positions, but the data may be less 
helpful for identifying the causes for high-ranking PLA officers’ involvement in the 
selling of military positions.   
Problems in the selection and appointment of military officers 
Fieldwork data suggests that formal rules for appointing PLA officers are distorted by 
guanxi practices and promotion opportunities are unjustly distributed within the 
military. This section therefore investigates problems in the decision-making process 
over promotions in the military and examines the logic of allocating promotion 
opportunities. As empirical data reveals, the selection and appointment of military 
officers follows the rule of guanxi (renren weiqin, 任人唯亲) rather than meritocratic 
principles (renren weixian, 任人唯贤).   
Concentration of power in the military promotion system 
The PLA has a set of formal rules for the appointment and promotion of personnel. 
Jiang Zemin, the core of the third generation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
leadership, tried to standardize the PLA promotion system.
45
 In December 2000, the 
19
th
 meeting of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress 
approved the amendment of the Regulations of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
on the Military Services of Officers in Active Service.
46
 The new regulation aimed to 
create clear and uniform requirements for the appointment and removal of PLA 
officers. For example, Article 4 of the new regulation stresses the importance of 
political integrity, professional competence and measurable performance in the 
selection of officers. Article 10 states that operational, political, logistics and 
armaments officers should have received training in schools or academies prior to 
promotion.  
The Party constitution stipulates that “all major issues should be decided upon by the 
party committees after discussion” in accordance to the principle of “collective 
leadership” (jiti lingdao, 集体领导), “democratic centralism” (minzhu jizhong, 民主
集中), “consultations before formal meetings” (huiqian yunniang, 会前酝酿)47, and 
“decisions through formal meetings” (huiyi jueding, 会议决定).48 This principle also 
applies to the selection and appointment of military officers, because the PLA is 
                                                          
45
 Li, Xiaobing 2012. 
46
 For more information, please see: “Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress on Amending the Regulations of the Chinese People's Liberation Army on the Military 
Service of Officers in Active Service,” 28 December 2000, 
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=32107&lib=law. Accessed 5 May 2015. 
47
 According to interviewees, “consultations before formal meetings” refers to “case-specific/ 
individual consultations” (gebie yunniang, 个别酝酿). 
48
 Lin 2013, 39; see also Zeng 2015; Zuo 2015.    
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controlled by the CCP.
49
 However, the Party constitution fails to detail operational 
procedure for this decision-making principle, resulting in the ambiguous and flexible 
application of this principle and creating opportunities for superiors to abuse it for 
private profit.
50
 This is especially true for the military. On the one hand, the PLA 
emphasizes the importance of speed and efficiency in decision-making in order to 
improve conflict and crisis management.
51
 On the other hand, the decision-making 
process within the PLA is not subject to external monitoring by the media and civic 
groups.
52
 The need for efficient decision-making and the lack of external monitoring 
result in an opaque process for appointing military officers and the concentration of 
power over personnel selections in the PLA.   
In practice, decision-making power is concentrated in the hands of two officers—the 
political officer and the commander—in every unit at the company level and above. 
This “dual-leadership system” (shuang zhuguan zhi, 双主官制) is designed to set up 
the mechanism of mutual supervision, but in reality the political officer and the 
commander tend to collaborate with each other to promote their common interests.
53
 
A retired military officer offers his understanding of the mutually-beneficial network 
between the political officer and the commander: 
This does not mean that these two officers must agree with each other all the time. 
They can disagree with each other. But they have to compromise to reach 
consensus and make decision together…solidarity among members of a party 
branch (dangwei banzi, 党委班子), especially between the political officer and 
the commander, is an important component of performance assessment. Frequent 
conflicts between them would raise inevitable questions about these officers’ 
ability to cooperate, decreasing their chances of promotion.
54
  
The concentration of power steers the selection and promotion processes away from 
collective leadership. The appointment of officers relies only on the principle of 
“consultations before formal meetings”. 55  Before decision-making through formal 
meetings, every member understood leaders’ intentions and knew who would 
ultimately gain promotion; in other words, weak collective leadership leads to unfair 
distribution of promotion opportunities.
56
 In order to balance different interest groups, 
the political officer and the commander need to know what guanxi resources 
candidates possess, understand which positions candidates occupy in different guanxi 
networks, and examine whether the promotion of an officer will bring them personal 
benefit.
57
 That is to say, the distribution of promotion opportunities is not only the 
                                                          
49
 Interview with military officer H, Beijing, April 2015. 
50
 Lin 2013; Yu 2010. 
51
 Scobell and Wortzel 2005. 
52
 Saunders and Scobell 2015. 
53
 Ibid.  
54
 Skype interview with former military officer P, October 2015. 
55
 Interview with former military officer C, Tianjin, April 2015. 
56
 Interview with former military officer L, Tianjin, April 2015. 
57
 Interview with military officer H. 
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process of exchanging power for money but also an important way of seeking future 
rewards from guanxi networks.   
Privileged groups and hometown ties 
The lack of monitoring of officers who control personnel appointment and removal 
enables these officers to maximize their personal interests by creating tailored 
standards for the selection of competent officers.
 58
 The existence of a special group of 
officers—“three types of princes” (sanye, 三爷 )—has significantly destroyed 
motivation in the PLA and distorts public trust in the military. These ‘princes’ are 
sons of senior officers (shaoye, 少爷), sons-in-law of senior officers (guye, 姑爷) and 
secretaries of senior officers (shiye, 师爷). Although family members are not allowed 
to hold positions directly under the leadership of each other, senior officers have an 
immense incentive to employ all their resources to assist their relatives’ promotions.59 
Officers at the level of corps leader and above are allowed to have full-time 
secretaries. This long-term leader–subordinate relationship provides opportunities for 
senior officers and secretaries to share their emotional reactions to work-related and 
private issues, resulting in the development of deep affection for each other. 
Secretaries therefore occupy important positions in senior officers’ guanxi networks 
and have obvious advantages when seeking promotion opportunities.
60
 Making use of 
the influence of senior members, these princes can gain promotions even though their 
profiles do not meet all the essential criteria, for example university training and work 
experience. The common practice is that after these princes get promoted, they find 
opportunities to fulfill the requirements they should have met before promotion.
61
  
The hometown tie is another essential factor for selecting military officers. Reflecting 
the Chinese saying “fixed barracks, floating soldiers” (tieda de yingpan, liushui de 
bing, 铁打的营盘，流水的兵), officer turnover in the military is high. The first and 
fundamental task a newly appointed unit leader has to deal with is to quickly take 
control of his unit’s overall situation. A widely accepted strategy is appointing 
subordinate officers whom the unit leader trusts to important positions. Strong ties 
between the newly appointed unit leader and his subordinates sometimes do not exist 
at the beginning, requiring the unit leader to develop and nurture guanxi within the 
                                                          
58 The PLA established the cadre department (ganbu bu, 干部部) in every unit at regimental level and 
above. Its purpose is to take charge of promotions and reassignments for military officers. But the 
cadre department tends to design promotion criteria based on the instruction of unit leaders—the 
political officer and the commander—due to the lack of independence. The head of the cadre 
department is commonly appointed by the unit party committee headed by unit leaders and the daily 
operation of this department is supervised by the same committee. 
59
 China’s one child policy has been strictly enforced in the PLA, which means that each military 
family only has one child. Familial obligations encourage senior officers to favor their children by 
ignoring laws and regulations.  
60
 Interview with former military officer K, Tianjin, April 2015. 
61
 Interview with military officer F, Beijing, April 2015. 
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unit. Making use of guanxi bases
62
 helps the unit leader to establish strong 
relationships with subordinates within a short period. The unit leader will review 
officers’ personnel files to identify officers from prominent military families or 
officers who come from the same hometown or graduated from the same university as 
the unit leader.
63
  
The existence of guanxi bases enables two persons to build strong ties easily and 
quickly.
64
 Take the hometown tie (laoxiang guanxi, 老乡关系) for example; PLA 
officers tend to group together according to locality of origin. Officers who have 
hometown ties can quickly develop deep affection among each other due to the 
existence of a common language (gongtong yuyan, 共同语言), and speaking dialect 
shortens their psychological distance.
65
 The importance of guanxi, especially 
hometown ties, in the selection and promotion of officers encourages many lower-
level officers to change their localities of origin in their personnel files and learn new 
dialects in order to secure promotion.
66
  
Costs of hard work and integrity 
Hard work is not the key for PLA officers to achieve career advancement. A widely 
accepted hidden principle in the PLA is that “conducting a dirty/bad thing together 
with your superior is better than doing ten good things for him/her” (gei lingdao ban 
shijian haoshi, buru yu lingdao ban yijian huaishi, 给领导办十件好事, 不如与领导
办一件坏事).67 To be specific, taking up additional workload and responsibility for 
the unit or senior members is not an effective strategy for promotion, because it does 
not add credit for hard work but increases the possibility of making mistakes. As a 
soon-to-be-demobilized PLA officer notes: 
Mistakes are inevitable…doing more work than others means you have more 
chance of making a mistake, or unintentionally offending your superior(s).
68
 
However, jointly committing corrupt activities (“dirty things”) is one of the most 
effective ways for lower-level officers to win trust and affection from their leaders. 
‘Dirty things’ refers to all types of corrupt activities, including reselling scarce 
resources monopolized by the military on the open market, embezzling military assets 
(money or property), creating false accounts, and assisting promotions by violating 
                                                          
62
 Guanxi bases, as Chen, Chen and Huang argue, “usually refer to pre-existing particularistic ties 
between two interacting parties”. Tsang suggests that guanxi bases can be divided into blood bases and 
social bases. The existence of guanxi bases does not automatically produce active guanxi. The 
establishment of active guanxi needs triggers: finishing a task (shiqing, 事情) through the cooperation 
of two partners, a process through which xinren, ganqing and renqing are produced. For more 
discussion, please see: Chen, Chen and Huang 2013, 171; Fan 2002a; Tsang 1998.  
63
 Interview with military researcher E, Beijing, April 2015. 
64
 Fan 2002b. 
65
 Interview with former military officer N, Beijing, April 2015. 
66
 Interview with military researcher E. 
67
 Interview with military officer H; interview with former military officer K. 
68
 Interview with military officer H. 
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regulations.
69
 Collaboration in committing an immoral or illegal act is extremely 
helpful for lower-level officers to become key members of senior officers’ guanxi 
networks.  
It is important to note that not all military officers seek career advancement through 
corruption. In fact, there are many upright officers in the PLA, but they are more 
likely to be isolated by power-holders.
70
 A former military officer shared his 
experience of offending a senior officer due to his adherence to the principle of 
fairness:  
A division deputy leader asked me to provide assistance for the promotion of his 
laoxiang (a junior officer who was from the same hometown as him). I was 
reluctant to offer assistance because his laoxiang, according to my perception, 
was unqualified for promotion. His promotion would be unfair to other 
competent candidates. I gave the leader the reasons why I was not able to help, 
but my refusal angered him. He threatened to remove me from my position, in 
the end I compromised. The outcome was that his laoxiang gained promotion as 
planned but I was given no opportunity for further promotion.
71
 
The experience of this interviewee is described as “change the person if he does not 
change his mind” (buhuan sixiang jiu huanren, 不换思想就换人). Every PLA officer 
is required to unconditionally obey (juedui fucong, 绝对服从) his or her superior’s 
orders and instructions, but there is a lack of guidance concerning what personnel 
should do if these orders contradict laws and regulations.
72
 There are two kinds of 
path from which a military officer may stray: the path laid down by his or her 
superiors, and the path designed by the full set of laws and regulations of the PLA and 
the CCP. A military officer has to make a choice when two paths do not coincide: 
selecting the first results in illegitimacy and choosing the second leads to 
insubordination. The rational choice made by the vast majority of officers is to 
unconditionally obey orders regardless of moral or legal doubts.
73
  
To sum up, the concentration of power in the hands of superiors and the lack of 
external monitoring encourage superiors to maximize personal interests by following 
guanxi rules in the distribution of promotion opportunities. Military officers who 
belong to privileged groups (e.g. princes) or have hometown ties with superiors are 
more likely to gain promotion. The military norm of unquestioning obedience makes 
officers believe that unconditionally obeying superiors’ unethical requests is both 
natural and moral, while officers who perform their duties strictly according to laws 
and regulations are more likely to offend their superiors and thus lose career 
advancement opportunities. 
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Functions of guanxi in the buying and selling of military positions  
Fieldwork data suggests that being a member of superiors’ guanxi networks is cost-
effective: it enhances the chances of gaining promotion and decreases the risk of 
being punished. The attractive returns generated by guanxi networks encourage PLA 
officers to employ this informal mechanism to get things done. The following 
discussion therefore investigates the function of guanxi in the buying and selling of 
military positions: communication, exchange and neutralization. 
Communication   
Government officials and businesspeople involved in corrupt transactions need to find 
a secret and safe communication channel for information exchange, because 
information relating to bribery and corruption cannot be disclosed to the public.
 74
 In 
order to avoid being caught by law enforcement agencies, buyers and sellers of 
corrupt benefits tend to rely on guanxi networks to gain access to secret and reliable 
information.
75
The communication channel provided by guanxi networks is 
characterized by a high level of secrecy and lack of transparency as information is 
only available to insiders (i.e. guanxi members).
76
  
While businesspeople rely on guanxi networks to identify government officials who 
are able to sell corrupt benefits, PLA officers do not have such concerns, for three 
reasons: (1) the military is a closed system and information about the sale of 
promotions in the PLA (e.g. ‘price tags’ for different positions77) is an open secret; (2) 
there is no need to identify a seller through guanxi networks, because the power to 
allocate appointments is concentrated in the hands of superiors; and (3) there is no 
need to look for buyers through guanxi networks, because under the ‘up or out’78 
system, all officers, especially lower-ranking officers, have an incentive to buy 
promotions.   
Although it is clear who the buyers and sellers are in the market of selling military 
positions, the importance of guanxi networks in identifying preferred transaction 
partners cannot be neglected. Faced with different buyers, the office seller tends to 
employ guanxi networks to collect reliable information about these potential buyers. 
This strategy enables the seller to assess the credibility and trustworthiness of each 
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buyer.
79
 Similarly, before starting a transaction, the buyer tends to rely on guanxi 
networks to collect private and trustworthy information about the seller, such as 
reputation. Superiors who always meet their promises (e.g. assisting promotions) are 
defined as high-quality sellers. The reputation of those superiors who take bribes but 
do not deliver what they promised will be destroyed, because information about 
dishonest behavior can be quickly transmitted through guanxi networks.
80
 In addition, 
office buyers who do not possess direct connections with sellers have to employ 
guanxi networks to identify middlemen who can facilitate corrupt transactions.
81
 
Exchange 
The major function of the guanxi network is facilitating exchange. As Zhan argues, 
corrupt benefits are distributed according to “a preference ordering, with those closer 
to them enjoying higher priorities in receiving the corrupt benefits than those farther 
away”.82 Fieldwork data shows that guanxi and bribe payment are two determining 
factors for the buying and selling of military positions.
 83
 To be specific, military 
positions come with price tags, but transactions between office sellers and buyers 
would not happen if assurances were not provided by guanxi networks.
84
   
In the 1990s, office seekers tended to make payments after obtaining promotion and 
price tags for military positions did not exist. Trust, affection and moral obligation 
played essential roles in the buying and selling of military positions. Since the 2000s, 
bribe payments have become necessary for office buyers to reach agreement with 
office suppliers. That is to say, a buyer who wants to gain promotion has to meet the 
following conditions: (1) s/he has to accept the price tag and make payment 
beforehand; and (2) s/he must possess strong guanxi ties with the seller or find a 
middleperson whose request cannot be rejected by the seller.
85
 Interviewees point to 
two main reasons for the change in the timing of payment. Firstly, monetary success, 
as a principal cultural goal, has been instilled and enforced within the military since 
China’s economic reform. As a former military officer argues: 
From PLA officers’ perspective, money becomes more and more 
important…power will expire when they retire, but money does not have an 
expiration date…in order to have a decent life after retirement, army officials 
have incentives to accumulate capital by transforming their power into money.
86
 
Secondly, buyers tend to pay first because competition for promotion is getting 
tougher. In the 1980s and 1990s, lack of a university degree was the biggest obstacle 
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for lower-level officers to gain promotion, but in the new millennium, the vast 
majority of PLA officers are university graduates. This means there are increasing 
numbers of qualified candidates for each position, giving rise to more competition for 
promotion.
87
 The use of corruption in career advancement has become a major way 
for PLA officers to seek psychological comfort. As a former military officer who is 
now a senior government official says: 
Using payment to get things done (huaqian banshi, 花钱办事) is an old tradition 
and is still widely practiced today. Help seekers usually seek psychological 
comfort by paying bribes, because the acceptance of the payment by senior 
officers signals that what the seekers want is highly likely to be achieved. 
Refusing to accept payment means that there is no way to get things done.
88
  
Bribe payment has become an important factor for ordinary military officers seeking 
promotion, which raises the question of whether highly competent candidates need to 
bribe senior officers. Fieldwork data shows that bribe payment is an indispensable—
although not, on its own, sufficient—aspect of obtaining career advancement even for 
competent officers. As an interviewee argues: 
Competent officers face a dilemma: to pay or not to pay. They can either choose 
to pay a cheaper price (e.g. 50,000RMB) in advance to secure the promotion, or 
they have to pay a much higher price (e.g. 100,000RMB) for the same promotion 
if they fail in the competition of promotion due to the lack of payment 
beforehand…in reality, PLA officers are less likely to get promoted without 
payment.
89
  
Payment in advance is used by the buyer to signal trust and loyalty to the seller. 
Under such circumstances, the function of payment is to offer assurance for corrupt 
transactions.
90
 The buyer who chooses not to pay in advance usually fails to gain 
promotion and ends up having to pay more for the same position. The main reasons 
for paying a higher price include: (1) a PLA officer who misses the first promotion 
opportunity falls behind his or her peer group and thus feels much more pressure to 
gain promotion; and (2) the officer who is in charge of appointment and promotion 
has to find a new opportunity for the late payer, costing time and energy.
91
 In this case, 
the extra payment is to compensate the seller for the additional workload. Payments 
have become an indispensable element for PLA officers seeking promotion, but it is 
important to note that transactions will not happen if guanxi ties do not exist. The 
existence of guanxi networks—secret and safe trading platforms—is a necessary 
precondition for corrupt transactions. 
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The downfall of Xu Caihou, once the PLA’s second-highest ranking officer, raises the 
question of why high-ranking officers engage in corruption. It is obvious that Xu had 
achieved culturally defined goals including high social status. Special benefits, 
including housing, health care and education, provided by the Chinese government to 
top government/military officers and their families make the accumulation of wealth 
unattractive. However, Xu was still deeply involved in selling military positions. 
News reports disclosed that one officer paid Xu 20 million RMB to obtain a high 
rank.
92
 Interviewee perspectives help to make clear the importance of guanxi and cash 
payment in corrupt exchanges involving high-ranking officers: 
Xu did not actually need the money, but the cash transactions were important for 
both Xu and the buyers. For office buyers, cash payment is the most important 
way for them to show their respect, appreciation and care…for office sellers, 
high-ranking officers find it impossible to meet the expectations of all the 
members of their extensive guanxi networks, thus a price tag for each position is 
helpful, allowing them to decline demands from guanxi members who are unable 
to pay…This lowers sellers’ ‘workloads’ and avoids disputes with guanxi 
members.
93
  
Cash payment, as interview data suggests, is perceived by military officers as the 
most efficient and effective way to create emotional bonding with superiors.
94
 
Emotional components, such as love, care, appreciation and respect, are embedded in 
cash payments in corrupt transactions. The offer and acceptance of bribes is an 
important process for deepening ganqing and strengthening guanxi among corrupt 
officers. The stronger the emotional component, the closer the guanxi; the closer the 
guanxi, the more trust, assurance and security guanxi provides for corrupt exchanges.  
Promotions and military positions have been transformed into commodities marketed 
through guanxi networks. A price tag for each position brings convenience to both the 
seller and the buyer, improving the efficiency of transactions.
95
 Price tags are helpful 
for transaction partners to avoid disputes and maintain face. With price tags, the seller 
avoids the embarrassment of asking the buyer directly for payment, and s/he can 
refuse requests from guanxi members who are not willing to pay. Equally, a price tag 
means the buyer does not need to guess how much s/he has to pay for the position. 
The absence of price tags brings uncertainty to the buying and selling of military 
positions. As an interviewee explains: 
First, paying more than the seller’s expected figure creates an extra financial 
burden for the buyer; second, paying less than the figure leads to dissatisfaction 
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from other side, which can even result in transaction failure, loss of face and 
damaged guanxi.
96
  
The study of military corruption in China reveals an enhanced level of 
commercialization in guanxi dealings, but it is important to note that corrupt 
exchanges are very different from ordinary market transactions. The illegal nature of 
corrupt exchanges prevents participants from resorting to legal protection and market 
mechanisms; participants therefore have to rely on alternative protection and 
enforcement mechanisms (e.g. guanxi). Moreover, the closeness of guanxi is an 
important factor for the allocation of military positions. Only military officers who 
have strong ties with their superiors and accept price tags are eligible to compete for 
important positions (e.g. the head of the cadre department and leaders of subordinate 
units). As an interviewee explains: 
For senior officers, appointing candidates who are closer to them in the guanxi 
network to important positions is important due to three reasons: first, it ensures 
efficient cooperation among superiors and subordinates; second, it offers a safe 
environment for misconducts and corruption; third, it enables senior officers to 
retain their influence in the military after their retirement…for lower-level 
officers, they usually appreciate being given a chance of “buying” important 
positions because not all junior staff have such opportunities. The investment will 
be recovered quickly as new positions bring them more opportunities to abuse 
power to earn personal profit.
 97
  
Neutralization 
According to Li, guanxi norms (e.g. the principle of reciprocity and the norm of gift-
giving) help break down the moral and cognitive barriers of corrupt transactions.
98
 “A 
government official is at the same time a private person embedded in a guanxi 
network”; s/he therefore feels obliged to meet demands from guanxi networks even 
though such demands usually conflict with social and legal norms.
99
 The study of 
buying promotions and selling positions in the PLA suggests that guanxi networks 
normalize corrupt transactions through the neutralization process.   
The origin of neutralization theory can be found in Sykes and Matza’s research on 
juvenile delinquency.
100
 Its main argument is that youth offenders tend to adopt 
techniques of neutralization to neutralize the guilt of delinquency behavior and 
rationalize their actions when they violate social norms.
101
 Neutralization theory is 
helpful to examine how corrupt PLA officers use guanxi norms to neutralize their 
guilt, lessen their responsibilities and protect their self-images. Fieldwork data 
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suggests that corruption transactions are neutralized in two major ways: deny harm to 
the victim and appeal to guanxi norms.  
Deny harm to the victim.  Denial of harm is frequently used by transaction 
participants to rationalize their acts. In the military, the promotion of PLA officers is 
largely influenced by the practice of guanxi.
102
 Most officers believe they are justified 
in employing guanxi networks to gain promotion. According to their understanding, 
achieving career advancement through guanxi networks is fair and also widely 
accepted.
103
 As a former military officer says, 
From the perspective of personal capacity, there is a lack of individual 
differences in the military. The absence of wartime challenges in the past three 
decades makes it difficult for senior officers to select competent officers...in most 
circumstances, almost all the candidates are qualified for promotion, but 
positions are very limited…in practice, competition for promotion is a game of 
guanxi competition. We all know that the strength and closeness of guanxi 
between candidates and superiors are determining factors…if you lose the game, 
you cannot blame anyone but yourself because you do not have enough guanxi 
resources.
104
 
It is clear that corrupt guanxi networks harm the whole organization by distorting 
social norms and legal institutions. However, transaction participants look only at 
individual-level benefits rather than organizational costs. According to their 
understanding, it is hard to find a victim because all participants in such transactions 
are beneficiaries. As an interviewee argues: 
If you are a middleman, you will find that facilitating transactions brings benefits 
to all parties involved: firstly, it helps the office sellers (senior officers) to earn 
profits; secondly, it enables the buyers to gain promotions; thirdly and most 
importantly, you create close ties with senior officers through assisting these 
transactions, thus senior officers are more likely to distribute promotions and 
opportunities to you in the future. You see, all are beneficiaries, no victims at 
all.
105
  
Appeal to guanxi norms.  The PLA promotion system is characterized by a lack of 
transparency and checks and balances. This weak formal system fails to prevent 
senior officials from abusing power to meet the demands made on them by guanxi 
members. Buying promotions and selling military positions have therefore become 
highly embedded within guanxi networks. Participants in the buying and selling of 
military positions usually use the norms of guanxi to justify their behaviors.     
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Guanxi practitioners need to follow the rule of renqing, the main feature of which is 
‘the necessity of reciprocity, obligation and indebtedness in interpersonal relations’.106 
To build closer guanxi, gift-giving within guanxi networks is widely practiced by 
Chinese people.
107
 Under intense competitive pressure and the popular culture of gift-
giving, low- and mid-level military officers feel obliged to pay monetary 
compensation as a major way of showing their respect, care, gratitude and 
appreciation. It is an essential strategy for creating renqing and cultivating ganqing 
with senior officers. Accepting bribe payments containing emotional expressions is an 
obligation for senior officers, because declining to accept the payment will result in 
the breakdown in mutual affection (ganqing polie, 感情破裂), more disputes and 
even the destruction of senior officers’ reputation within guanxi networks. The high 
cost of saying “no” to guanxi members, especially those who have strong ties, 
compels senior officers accept bribe payment. Acceptance generates further 
obligations and creates indebtedness: senior members must meet the expectations of 
bribers in order to return their renqing and deepen their ganqing. Guanxi norms such 
as reciprocity and obligation therefore create a vicious corrupt exchange circle of 
‘giving—accepting—returning’. 
Guanxi members who fail to reciprocate favors are despised by other guanxi members 
as dishonest or lacking human feelings (mei renwei, 没人味). 108 In an interview, a 
former military officer points out that: 
Senior officers are “kidnapped” by guanxi networks. They feel obliged to assist 
those who are close to them within guanxi networks to obtain promotion…it is 
also an effective way for them to develop their reputation in guanxi networks and 
maintain influence in the military.
109
 
In order to maintain and develop a favorable reputation, all payments will be returned 
to buyers if office sellers fail to deliver the promised corrupt benefits.
110
 Such 
informal mechanisms also prevent the buyers from reporting cases to the commissions 
of party discipline inspection, lowering the risk of detection and punishment. Another 
interviewee mentions the role of guanxi norms in combating office sellers’ feelings of 
guilt: 
Guanxi norms are fig leaves. They (corrupt officers) do not feel guilty or 
ashamed. They perceive that their involvement in illegal businesses is not just for 
themselves but also for their families, friends, brotherhoods, and wider groups 
(guanxi networks). High praise from guanxi members helps reduce guilty 
feelings (about committing corrupt acts).
111
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Similarly, recognition from guanxi members is important for the office buyer, because 
the seller is usually within the same guanxi network as the buyer. A bad reputation in 
guanxi networks leads to isolation, while a good reputation enhances the possibility of 
career advancement.
112
 In this case, guanxi norms are much more important to 
network members than social norms and legal institutions, and guanxi members’ 
perceptions are more important than the perceptions of outsiders.  
The discussion above indicates that guanxi facilitates the buying and selling of 
military positions through three ways: enhancing communications, guaranteeing 
exchanges and reducing moral hazards. These functions encourage military officers to 
make use of guanxi practices to advance personal interests and gain promotions.  
Conclusion 
This paper offers an exploratory study of the role of guanxi in facilitating the buying 
and selling of military positions. Fieldwork data suggests that the PLA’s ineffective 
promotion system—the concentration of power and the lack of external monitoring—
encourages senior officers to allocate promotion opportunities by following guanxi 
rules rather than meritocratic principles. The buying and selling of military positions 
through guanxi practices is an attractive strategy for most PLA officers. Following in 
the footsteps of Li
113
 and Zhan,
114
 this paper contributes to the study of “the 
corruption-facilitating roles of guanxi” by examining how guanxi practices increase 
corrupt benefits and reduce the risk of punishment by offering a safe channel for 
communication, preventing nonperformance on either side and neutralizing the guilt 
of committing corruption. Using guanxi when buying and selling military positions is 
therefore a rational choice for officers seeking promotion.  
This paper also investigates the relationship between bribe payment and guanxi in the 
buying and selling of military positions. In the new century, bribes have become an 
essential, although not sufficient, factor for corrupt exchanges. Bribes—usually in the 
form of cash payment—are a major way for buyers of promotion to express respect 
and appreciation and to create renqing and deepen ganqing with sellers of military 
position. Guanxi norms such as reciprocity and obligation help those involved in the 
transaction justify their actions and encourage military officers to satisfy guanxi 
members’ needs regardless of laws and regulations. It is important to note that corrupt 
transactions would not happen if the assurance generated by guanxi practices did not 
exist. The degree of closeness of guanxi is also important when senior officers 
allocate promotion opportunities; only those who are closer to power holders in 
guanxi networks are qualified to compete for important positions.  
Corruption is a global phenomenon, but the study of corruption in developing 
countries requires researchers to take local context and culture into consideration 
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rather than directly transplant of western theories. The integration of the concept of 
guanxi in the examination of military corruption in China allows the identification of 
the specific nature of corruption in the PLA. It offers a culturally-specific meaning 
and understanding of what causes PLA officers to engage in the selling and buying of 
positions and how military officers employ guanxi to tackle the environmental and 
behavioral uncertainties associated with corrupt exchanges. Incorporating the concept 
of guanxi also contributes to the understanding of the social and cultural 
embeddedness of corruption and provides valuable resources for comparative 
corruption research.  
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